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NOTE
THE GROUP OF 77 DRAFT PROVISIONS .CONCERNING
SUPPLIER GUARANTEES FOR THE PROPOSED
INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY*
INTRODUCTION
At any given time, a variety of multilateral United Nations-
sponsored negotiations are in progress. Of those underway
presently, perhaps none is more important than the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) In-
tergovernmental Working Group negotiations leading toward an
International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology. These
negotiations on technology transfer are a crucial element in the
global dialogue on the New International Economic Order. This
Note will focus on the Group of 77 draft provisions regarding
guarantees to be made by suppliers of technology in international
transfer of technology agreements, and will argue that these draft
provisions are, by and large, reasonable, and should therefore be
acceptable to the United States and other developed nations.
An initial question which arises concerning United States and
Group B' participation in the UNCTAD negotiations leading
toward such an international code, is "why bother?" Despite an oc-
casional voice in opposition,2 the consensus seems to be that the
* The author would like to express his thanks for their helpful suggestions and criticisms
to Professor Gabriel Wilner, Professor of Law at the University of Georgia School of Law
and Consultant to the UNCTAD Secretariat for the Intergovernmental Group of Experts
on an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology in Geneva, Switzerland, and
to Professor Dennis Thompson, Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Georgia
School of Law and Editor-in-Chief of the JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE LAW.
' The Group B nations are negotiating as a bloc at the sessions of the Intergovern-
mental Group of Experts on an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology,
sponsored by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The
Group B nations (also known as "The West," the "developed countries," and the "First
World") are virtually all members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). They are grouped together in this Note because of their collective
Draft Text submitted at the UNCTAD-sponsored negotiations.
' Note, Technology, Trade, and the Law: A Preliminary Exploration, 6 LAW & POLY
INT'L Bus. 85 (1974).
This particular Note, in fact, does not argue that the Third World is benefitting from the
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Group B nations, and especially the United States, are greatly
benefitted by the present system of technology transfer.' The
United States and other developed nations prosper in the preser-
vation of the status quo.' However, there are several important
reasons why we should bother.
First, without the United States and the Group B nations, the
Group of 775 and the Group D nations8 might develop a code of
present transfer of technology system; rather, it argues that the United States is losing its
once-enormous technological advantage (in development of technology and in transfer to
others) because we are failing to encourage the development of new technology. We are
losing our edge, the Note argues, to Japan and Western Europe.
' What is comprehended by "transfer of technology" is set out in An International Code
of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
TD/B/C.6/AC.1/2/Supp. 1/Rev. 1 at 10-11, 64 [hereinafter cited as An International Code of
Conduct]:
64. The code could, inter alia, cover the following practices and agreements:
(a) All acts, decisions or agreements associated with the establishment and
operation of wholly-owned subsidiaries or affiliates and of joint ventures (with
various degrees of participation), involving either implicitly or explicitly the
transfer of technology. The code would thus cover transactions entered into by in-
dependent constituent legal or economic units, and technological operations
within one economic unit;
(b) Agreements or acts for the sale of technology, for example purchases of
machinery, industrial plants, equipment, intermediate goods and raw materials, in
so far as they are part of an operation involving a technological transaction;
transfers or assignments of proprietary rights such as patents, industrial designs,
etc.;
(c) Agreements or acts for the licensing, lease or use of technology, for exam-
ple licensing agreements covering the right to use or exploit patents, utility
models, industrial designs, or any other industrial property right as defined by
the relevant law and/or international convention; agreements or acts for the use
of or authorization to exploit trade marks, service marks, trade names, indication
of source or appellations of origin, in so far as they are part of a transaction in-
volving technology transfer;
(d) Agreements or acts involving the flow of technological information, for ex-
ample transactions covering the provision of technical knowledge, know-how and
technical expertise in the form of plans, diagrams, models, instructions, guides,
formulations, specifications, personnel training, and other modalities including
the transfer of technical information applicable to productive detailed engineering
designs for the installation and operation of plant and equipment and for the pro-
duction of goods and services.
(e) Industrial collaboration agreements of any kind, including sub-contracting
as well as the provision of management, technical and marketing services.
This definition of "transfer of technology" shall also serve in this Note as a non-exclusive
definition of "technology."
Support for this statement is provided in Section IA of this Note, infra.
' Now numbering well over 100 nations, the Group of 77 is a coalition made up prim-
arily of developing nations.
' Group D is comprised of communist nations: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
Eastern European nations, and Mongolia.
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conduct which would be completely unacceptable to the United
States, the other Group B nations, and the entire Western
business community. Since the legal nature of the code (i.e., bind-
ing or voluntary) is as yet undetermined,' we have little to lose
now but much to gain in later years by providing input for the
code, for it will surely be of great legal and economic significance
in the future, whatever its legal nature at the outset.
Second, a code, whatever its provisions and whatever its legal
nature, may preclude further piecemeal national legislation which
has tended, where it has appeared, towards severity in the
restrictions imposed on the freedom of parties to negotiate their
agreement on a technology transfer.' Furthermore, a rather
moderate code of conduct may tend to force a rollback of the
restrictive national legislation already passed, so that those na-
tions with such legislation will remain competitive in the market
for foreign technology.
Third, concern for our image in the international community
should lead us to negotiate. Those Group of 77 nations with which
we are friendly, and in which we invest, expect as a minimum that
we negotiate in good faith.
Fourth, it is important, in and of itself, that we continue a
dialogue on such an important subject at the global level. This
globalization of discussion will prevent unilateral national action
and special deals, and may well help to strengthen the United Na-
tions system.
Finally, and crucially (although this is the weakest dollars-and-
cents argument), the Group B nations ought to bargain seriously.
Whether one conceives of technology as private property, as just
another commodity on the world market (albeit an important one)
to be bought and sold subject to all the vagaries of the
marketplace,9 or, on the contrary, as part of the "common heritage
' "The UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group on Transfer of Technology . . . has been in-
structed to draft a code 'without prejudice to its legal nature.'" Davidow & Chiles, The
United States and the Issue of the Binding or Voluntary Nature of the International Codes
of Conduct Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 249 (1978).
' See, e.g., the legislation of Argentina (Law 19,231 published Sept. 15, 1971, and Law
21,617 of 1977), Brazil (Industrial Property Code, Law 5722, Dec. 21, 1971, DOU-1 of Dec. 31,
1971, and Normative Act 015 of Sept. 11, 1975 (reproduced in U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/2)), Mexico
(Technology Law, published in Official Daily of Dec. 30, 1972) and the Andean Pact (the An-
dean Foreign Investment Code (The Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and
of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126
(1971)).
' The Possibility and Feasibility of an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of
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of mankind,"'" which should be transferred as equitably and cheaply
as possible, with full consideration of the great needs and limited
financial resources of the Group of 77 nations, a strong case can be
made that an international code of conduct regulating the transfer
of technology is a necessary international remedy for the present
system and its maladies.
Assuming henceforth that negotiations toward an international
code of conduct for the transfer of technology are fully worth the
time and effort of Group B and the United States, this Note will
concentrate on one important aspect of such a code, supplier
guarantees. The Note is organized in the following manner: Sec-
tion I will provide background for the reader. It will explain how
the present system for the international transfer of technology
benefits Group B nations and their Transnational Enterprises
(TNEs) and hurts the technology importing nations of the Group
of 77.1 The importance of technology will be stressed. In addition,
the objectives of the proposed code will be examined briefly, along
with the role of guarantees within the framework of the entire
code. Section II will present in detail the Group of 77 proposals
concerning guarantees which are to be required of technology sup-
pliers. These proposals will be contrasted briefly with Group B
proposals concerning those guarantees made by the technology
supplier to the technology recipient. Next, Section III will discuss
United States law concerning guarantees (warranties) in tech-
nology transfer agreements. Section IV will provide a brief look at
current international practice in transfer of technology
agreements, with regard to guarantees. Section V of the Note will
present policy arguments in support of the proposition that most
of the Group of 77 proposals on guarantees are reasonable. In
light of the circumstances obtaining presently, the consequences
of Group B rejection of the Group of 77 proposals, and the prob-
Technology, A Study by the UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/22 at 5, 17
(1974) [hereinafter cited as The Possibility and Feasibility of an International Code].
'0 Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on an International Code of Con-
duct on Transfer of Technology on its Fourth Session [hereinafter cited as Report of the In-
tergovernmental Group of Experts], Annex II: Revised Text of Draft Outline of an Inter-
national Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, Submitted on behalf of the experts
from the Group of 77, Preamble, U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/11, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
453 at 463 (1977).
11 Thus it will be seen in Section II, examining the various draft proposals, that the
Group B Draft for the Code of Conduct reflects far more satisfaction with the status quo
than does the Group of 77 Draft Code. This is clearly shown by a comparison of the two
Drafts' provisions concerning guarantees.
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able results of their inclusion in an international code of conduct on
the transfer of technology, the Group of 77 proposals will be shown
as economically acceptable and politically advantageous. Briefly,
Group B counter-arguments will be examined. The Conclusion will
embody the preceding arguments in the form of a few proposals
for United States and Group B action at the Intergovernmental
Working Group Meetings sponsored by UNCTAD, now in pro-
gress in Geneva, Switzerland.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Importance of Technology
To put the UNCTAD discussions on a code of conduct in their
proper prespective, it is vital to understand the importance of
technology itself. "Today, technological progress is generally con-
sidered to be the most important factor in economic growth. Re-
cent studies estimate its contribution to productivity growth at
75%, if not even at 90%."2 Technological advances, "synonymous
with development,"13 form the most important of the "three col-
umns" on which the economic and social development of the Group
of 77 must depend." Some Group of 77 spokesmen have even
"rested the fate of the [North-South] dialogue ... on the outcome
of these negotiations ....
"Most of the valuable, useful and transferable technology in the
world lies in the hands of the industrialized or developed coun-
tries." 6 This is true of the technology whatever its legal form:
" Kunz-Hallstein, Patent Protection, Transfer of Technology and Developing Coun-
tries-A Survey of the Present Situation, 6 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 427,
428 (1975), citing GREFERMANN, OPPENLANDER, PEFFGEN, ROTHLINGSHOFER & SCHOLZ,
PATENTWESEN UND TECHNISCHER FORTSCHRITT, pt. I, "Die Wirkung des Patentwesens im In-
novationsprozeB," at 3 (1974).
" Id at 428, n. 8, citing Oldham, Freeman and Trukcan, "Trends and Problems in World
Trade and Development," UNCTAD Doc. TD/28, Supp. 1 at 6 (1967).
" Id at 429, citing a draft resolution by 26 developing countries for the 9th Session of the
Trade and Development Board. The other two columns are trade and finance.
," Davidow & Chiles, supra note 7, at 253, citing U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/4 at 1 12 (1976).
, Finnegan, A Code of Conduct Regulating International Technology Transfer: Panacea
or Pitfall?, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Socy 71 (1978).
It should not be overlooked that in theory there are two ways for those who need
technology to get it: first, to receive it from someone else who already has it, by sale,
license, gift or other transfer; second, to develop it "from scratch" through one's own
research and development efforts. See Kunz-Hallstein, note 12 supra, at 429. The concern of
this paper is generally the first method, and more specifically the transfer by sale, license
or other arrangement from First World TNE to an entity (a subsidiary, related corporation,
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patents, know-how, trade secrets, and the like are all
predominantly in the hands of the Group B nations.17 Further-
more, "almost all of this technology is owned by private com-
panies, not by the governments of these countries."' 8 These large
privately-owned companies do business internationally on a huge
scale.19 There is a clear link between the TNEs and technology,
production, wealth and power." Finally, "fully 900/o of the world's
MNCs are incorporated and headquartered in the United States.'
Group B nations, the United States among them, may envy the
Arabs their oil; Zaire, Zambia and Chile their copper; Jamaica
and Trinidad their bauxite, and Brazil and Columbia their coffee.
Yet the present system of technology transfer is nothing if not a
"technology cartel" in which the United States plays the leading
role. We have in a sense cornered the technology market, and it is
a seller's market. One of the keys to development, technology, is
locked within the vaults of the Group B TNEs, and leased or sold
at whatever price the market will bear.22
If technology were to be transferred at reasonable prices and
under reasonable terms and conditions, discussions leading
toward a code of conduct would be unnecessary. Yet TNEs, with
their stranglehold on worthwhile technology and their enormous
a natural person, an unrelated private corporation or a government agency) within a Third
World nation.
" Id. The developed countries include both Group B countries and Group D countries.
Group D is the socialist group. "The Group B countries, however, possess the major share
of the world's valuable technology . Id.
18 1&j
19 One writer has gone so far as to claim that "[bly the 1980's and continuing throughout
the remainder of this century, it is estimated that 75% of the world's trade and production
will be controlled by 300 or fewer MNC's [Multinational Corporations]." Comment, The
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and Foreign-Based Subsidiaries of American Multina-
tional Corporations: A Time to Abstain from Restraining, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 206, 209
(1973). ("MNC" as a term for these large corporations is herein abandoned in favor of TNE
(Transnational Enterprises), which is currently in vogue at the United Nations.)
20 .... [t]he decisions taken by multinational corporations regarding investment,
prices, costs, allocation of overheads and transfer pricing, research and develop-
ment expenses, etc. are seen as directly falling under the domain of public policy.
The controversy over nation-states' prerogatives and the multinational firm's
freedom of movement is a question of "what functions the nation state is likely to
continue to perform in an era of international capital" ....
Egea, Multinational Corporations in the Operation and Ideology of International Transfer
of Technology, 10 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEv. 11, 13 (1975).
" Note, Control of Multinational Corporations' Foreign Activities, 15 WASHBURN L. J.
435, 436 (1976), citing Comment, supra note 19.
The problems which arise from permitting the free play of ordinary market forces in
the sphere of transfer of technology agreements are outlined in Section V of this Note.
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wealth and power, can dictate the terms of many technology
transfer agreements. The "formidable array of restrictive clauses
that can be (and usually are) included in transfer of technology
agreements,''23 serve the interests of the TNEs and their owners.
Public relations efforts to the contrary notwithstanding, the
development of technology importing Group of 77 nations is a low
TNE priority. Real priorities are less altruistic. "The rate of
return [for United States direct investment in Third World na-
tions] is double that of investment in the developed countries""
(emphasis added). A strong element in the achievement of this
high rate of return is the retention of this dominant position in
technology. In 1966, for example, United States TNEs spent 94%
of their research and development dollars in the United States. Of
the remaining 6% of research and development dollars, two-thirds
(4%) was spent in Canada, West Germany and the United
Kingdom.25 Recent estimates of total research and development
expenditures in Third World nations as a percentage of the global
total are still as low as 1% or 2%.2"
The international patent system reflects this "quasi-monopoly"
position of TNEs in technology. To begin with, "[p]atents have
been justified as instruments to encourage inventive activity,
technological innovation and disclosure of information."'  In
theory, patents perform this function by giving the inventor a
monopoly in the use of his/her invention for a certain limited
period (17 years in the United States), after which the invention
" Egea, supra note 20, at 16. The author cites as examples the following:
(1) export restriction clauses to all countries or certain regions; (2) obligation to
purchase raw materials, intermediate products and/or capital goods and equip-
ment from licensor; (3) control by licensor of volume of production and sales, loca-
tion of production, transactions with other firms; (4) clauses requiring licensee to
transmit any improvement related to licensed process to licensor (sometimes free
of charge); (5) obligation to invest certain specified amounts on commercial adver-
tising of product manufactured with licensed process; (6) clauses allowing the
licensor to intervene in licensee's management decisions regarding production,
prices, new investments, etc.; (7) clauses which oblige licensee not to reveal or use
technical secrets after contract has expired; (8) conflicts over interpretation and
breach of contractual obligations are transferred to foreign courts.
Id.
24 The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Jul. 9, 1978 at 13, col. c.
' Mirabito, The Control of Technology Transfer: The Burke-Hartke Legislation and the
Andean Foreign Investment Code: The MNE Faces the Nations, 9 INT'L LAw. 215, 222
(1975).
" Id. See also THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE THIRD WORLD 14 (Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, November 1977).
2 Egea, supra note 20, at 18.
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falls into the public domain, available for use by anyone. Several
practices of TNEs in the sphere of international transfer of
technology agreements, however, frustrate the basic purposes of
the system in the technology receiving countries. First, grant-
back provisions in such agreements often force improvements in
the technology made in the receiving country to be given back to
the TNE in the developed nation. Second, license agreements
often cover both patents and unpatented know-how. "[W]hen the
patent expires and falls in the public domain, it cannot be used in
industry since the relevant know-how was not disclosed when the
application was filled out."28 Third, as was noted above, TNEs do
their research and development in their home countries, not their
host countries. Finally, TNEs practice "defensive" registration of
patents to insure their quasi-monopoly in technology in their host
countries.' Statistics on patent registration in some Group of 77
nations, and even some fairly well 'developed' nations, reflect this
technological advantage. The ratio of nationals to foreigners
holding patents in Chile declined from 1:2 in 1937 to 1:19 in 1967.
In Peru, the ratio declined from an already low 1:19 ratio in 1960
to a shocking 1:38 in 1970.11 Even in Greece, a Western European
nation, the ratio of nationals to foreigners who were granted
patents in 1967 was less than 1:3; in Portugal in the same year the
ratio was 1:12.31
The effects of this Group B technological lead over Group of 77
nations are adverse and enormous. The United States Tariff Com-
mission found that "the Multinational Corporations, in their tran-
sactions with the United States, exert a uniformly large, negative
impact on the current accounts of balance of payments of the host
2 Id.
"Id at 20.
Patents have become part of corporate business strategies. The accompanying
licenses of unpatented know-how and sales of technical assistance are the
mechanisms that permit a multinational corporation to tie the license with the
sale of capital goods and intermediate products. These are the arrangements that
at the operational level allow the multinational firm to "preserve its monopoly
rents" through an institutional monopoly that prolongs the life of the original
technological monopoly.
Id.
Extrapolation from the figures provided in Table 3: "Nationality of Patent Holders," in
Egea, supra note 20, at 21, taken from Oxman, "Notes sobre la comercializacion de tec-
nologia en los paises del Grupo Andino" (November 1971) (OAS/PRDCT, Mimeo).
"' Mirabito, supra note 25, at 219, citing E. P. HAWTHORNE, THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
47, 48 (1971).
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countries."' 2 The way that technology is transferred also ensures
that Group of 77 nations continue to export primary products and
import finished manufactured goods." Finally, payments by Group
of 77 nations for technology are already large (in one United Na-
tions study, amounting to 70/0 of the combined exports of six
developing nations 4 ) and are increasing rapidly."
B. The Objectives of the Code,
A distinguished American writer has suggested that the code
be drafted with a view towards three objectives:
(1) preserving an environment in which technology transfer is
potentially profitable for the transferor;
(2) improving the bargaining strength of a developing country
enterprise by defining reasonable external restraints to be placed
on the transferor; and
(3) retaining sufficient flexibility for both the transferor and
transferee to permit negotiation in any given situation on an ac-
ceptable consensus which is tailored to the needs of that situa-
tion."' (Emphasis added.)
This statement of objectives is somewhat unusual. A new inter-
national code is not needed to "preserve" and "retain" what
already exists. In fact, the only real purpose of the negotiations is
to change the system, to develop a code which will "improve ac-
Mirabito, supra note 25, at 219-20, note 35, citing T.C. PUBLICATION 537 at 29 (January
1973).
In 1967, the exports from Latin America were made up from the following
groups: Primary Products 87 percent, Semi-Manufactures 8 percent, Manufactures
5 percent. On the other hand, in developing the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), 73 percent of the exports were in
manufactured goods. Thus, Latin America remains dependent on unstable-priced
[sic] agricultural products for the bulk of its export earnings, while export earn-
ings from manufactured goods are pitifully small.
Mirabito, supra note 25, at 218 (footnotes omitted).
", Multinational Corporations in World Development, Report of the Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1973), cited in Mirabito, supra note 25,
at 217.
' Transfer of Technology, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, U.N.
Doc. TD/106 (1971), cited in Mirabito, supra note 25, at 217.
", No attempt is made here to trace the history of these negotiations on a code of conduct
for the transfer of technology. The proposals are those submitted by the Group of 77 and
Groups B and D at the Fourth Session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts, contained
in U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/11, Annexes I, II and III (1977). See text at notes 115-130, infra, for
the results of the latest session.
V Finnegan, supra note 16, at 77.
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cess to technology at fair and reasonable prices and costs"' and on
fair and reasonable terms. These terms should take into account
the "needs and conditions prevalent in developing countries."39
Elements of this main objective of changing the system include
the unpackaging of technology transfers, prevention of abuse of
the dominant position of the technology suppliers (through restric-
tive clauses in transfer of technology agreements), the develop-
ment of technological capability in technology receiving countries,
assurance of the effective performance of technology transfer
agreements, special treatment for developing countries, national
regulation of transfer of technology agreements by the receiving
country, equitable dispute settlement mechanisms and guarantees
by the parties to transfer of technology agreements. Of course,
these objectives should not be achieved in such a way that the
normal technology transaction from Group B TNE to Group of 77
receiving enterprise (either private company or government
agency) becomes unprofitable. Nevertheless, the point of the
negotiations is change. Keeping in mind that the changes must, in
the final analysis, improve the bargaining position of technology
recipients in the Group of 77 nations, this Note will now take a
closer look at the subject of guarantees.
C. The Role of Guarantees within the Code
The code will contain a number of "procedural" sections (such
as Principles and Objectives, Definitions and Scope of Application,
Legal Nature, National Regulation, and Applicable Law and Set-
tlement of Disputes) and some important "substantive" sections.
The most important of the latter are regulation of restrictive prac-
tices in transfer of technology arrangements, special treatment
for developing countries, and guarantees by source and recipient
enterprises. Of these "substantive" sections, the first two can
clearly benefit only technology recipients; thus these sections re-
quire Group B concessions. The section on guarantees, however,
cuts both ways: there are, on the one hand, those guarantees
which will be required of the technology supplier, and, on the
other hand, those guarantees which will be required for the
technology recipient.
In a sense, the guarantees required of technology recipients are
" An International Code of Conduct, supra note 3, at 29, 162.
" Id. at 5, 28(a).
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the positive counterpart to the concessions which must be made
by Group B concerning restrictive practices, special treatment for
developing countries and the guarantees required of the source
enterprises. The acquiring enterprise will be bound to abide fully
by the terms of the transfer agreement and by the other provi-
sions of the code relating to payments, security of investment,
compensation in the event of expropriation, and the like. This quid
pro quo will benefit both sides by stabilizing the conditions under
which technology is transferred.
II. GROUP OF 77 GUARANTEE PROPOSALS
A. Text and Discussion
Chapter V of the "Revised Text of Draft Outline of an Inter-
national Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology-submitted on
behalf of the experts from the Group of 7r' is called, simply,
"Guarantees." It is divided into three sections: first, guarantees
that shall be made by technology supplying enterprises; second,
guarantees that shall be made by technology receiving enter-
prises; and third, guarantees that the governments of technology
receiving countries may require in transfer of technology
agreements. Because the bone of contention is primarily the first
section, discussion of the other two sections is relegated to the
footnotes."
Chapter V. section 5.2:
The enterprises receiving technology shall in accordance with the spirit and the
standards of the Code, guarantee that:
(i) The technology acquired will be used as specified in the arrangement;
(ii) All legitimate payments as specified in the arrangement shall be made to
the technology supplier;
(iii) Technological secrets as defined in the arrangement shall be honoured
during the duration of the arrangement;
(iv) The quality standards of the product specified in the contract will be
reached and maintained where the contract includes the use of suppliers'
trademarks, trade name or similar identification of goodwill.
Only two items above are likely to provoke serious discussion: the use of the word
"legitimate" in (ii), and the "during the duration of the arrangement" clause in (iii).
As for "legitimate" payments, most Group B nations' contract law would presume
payments set forth in a valid contract to be legitimate; if the payments are not legitimate,
the payor should not have signed the arrangment and agreed to the payments. Alternative-
ly, the payor has a heavy burden of proof in showing the agreed-upon payments have
become illegitimate. "Legitimate" from this perspective is surplusage. Perhaps it is in-
serted as a Group of 77 "bargaining chip."
A more serious problem is presented by (iii. In the case of a patent license for ten years,
it seems fairly clear that under the international patent system, upon the expiration of a
license under the patent, the patent still belongs to the licensor, assuming the 17 year
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This first section is deceptively brief; it is quoted in full:
5.1 The enterprise supplying technology shall guarantee that:
(i) The technology acquired is suitable for the manufac-
period to be unexpired. More generally, one American has said that "[in the absence of an
agreement, however, it is the transferee which lacks a right to use technology protected by
valid property rights. Clauses which restrict use of unexpired property rights after agree-
ment expiration are therefore proper." Finnegan, supra note 16, at 101. In his footnote 73,
Finnegan cites Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), in which the United
States Supreme Court upheld such an agreement covering a trade secret. Finnegan sug-
gests that this is not an area where a blanket ban on post-expiry restrictions are ap-
propriate; rather, he says that this should be handled through "proper planning and
negotiation of the terms," id, and he suggests that "[a] clause providing for renegotiation of
the agreement after a certain period of time may help to provide some assurances of the
transferee's continued ability to use the technology if the commercial life should prove
longer than originally expected." Id. at 102. In the best of all possible worlds, leaving such a
thorny problem to the parties would be fine; but under the present transfer of technology
system, with the very unequal bargaining power of the parties (see Section V of this Note),
international restraints on such restrictive clauses may be necessary. One can easily en-
visage a situation in which a process containing both patents and trade secrets is licensed;
upon expiration of patent and license, however, royalties remain the same due to the impor-
tance of the "unexpired" property rights in the trade secrets.
It is clear that this particular "guarantee" by the receiver to the supplier of technology in
fact gives the receiving entity more than it gets under the status quo. It is just as clear that
this is likely to be a contended point. It seems probable, however, that the point will be set-
tled in the discussion of "restrictive business practices" rather than guarantees. See
Chapter IV of the Group of 77 Draft, "The Regulation of Practices and Arrangements In-
volving the Transfer of Technology," section 4.2(1), Restrictions after expiration of arrange-
ment, in Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts, supra note 10, at Annex II.
Chapter V, section 5.3, lists eight guarantees which may be required by the governments
of the technology-receiving countries. A few examples will suffice as a basis for comments:
(i) The technology is the most adequate to meet the particular technological re-
quirements of the recipient given the supplier's technological capabilities; ...
Query: what is the "most adequate" technology? Who decides what is the "most adequate"
and then, who decides whether or not the original decision was correct? What happens if
the technology selected was not the "most adequate"? Finally, if the supplier must make
the initial determination, can the supplier ever be obliged to give the business to a com-
petitor?
(iii) The undertaking to explore on a continuous basis the possibility of
substituting local inputs for imported materials, equipment and spare parts used
in the production process;...
If this guarantee is meant to be more than hortatory (i.e., the supplier should make a good-
faith effort to explore the possibilities), it could make for great uncertainty in transfer of
technology agreements. Again, the who and how of administration pose great practical pro-
blems.
(iv) More favorable terms granted by the supplier to a recipient should be extend-
ed to subsequent recipients in similar positions within the same country; ...
One writer states flatly, "[a] most favored licensee clause should not be required by a code
of conduct." Finnegan, note 16 supra, at 108. First, it is difficult to value technology; two
processes which seem quite similar may not really be so. Second, differences in contract
clauses may translate into differences in the value of the technology. Finally, in cases where
the supplier finds itself doing business at a loss but honoring its contract, if it is forced to
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ture of products covered by the arrangement;
(ii) The content of the technology transferred is full
and complete for the purposes of the arrangement;
(iii) The technology obtained will be capable of achiev-
ing a predetermined level of production under the condi-
tions specified in the agreement;
(iv) National personnel shall be adequately trained for
service in the recipient country in the knowledge of the
technology to be acquired including operation and
management techniques of the enterprises;
(v) The recipient shall have access to all improvements
upon the techniques in question during the lifetime of
the arrangement;
(vi) Where the recipient of the technology has no other
alternative than acquiring capital goods, intermediate in-
puts and/or raw materials from the technology supplier
or any other enterprise designated by him, the prices of
the articles shall not be higher than current interna-
tional price levels;
(vii) Where the recipient of the technology has no other
alternative than selling his output to the technology sup-
plier or any other enterprise designated by him, the
prices of the articles shall not be lower than current in-
ternational price levels;
(viii) Spare parts, components and other requirements
necessary for using the imported technology shall, if re-
quired by the recipient, be provided for a specified
period of time and without additional charges for main-
taining this guarantee;
(ix) The technology suppliers, while drawing up the
design specification of plants, will take fully into account
the possibility of utilizing locally available resources."1
The first guarantee, (i), that the technology is "suitable for the
manufacture of products covered by the arrangement," closely
resembles § 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code in its intent:
Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose. Where the
seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any par-
do business with others on the same losing terms, it may then become cheaper to breach
the first agreement.
(vi) The parties to the transfer of technology arrangement devote adequate
resources to research and development activities in the recipient country; ...
The same problems and criticisms raised above apply here. What is "adequate"?
1 Throughout the rest of this Note the guarantees shall be referred to by their Group of
77 Draft numbers, e.g. (i) (suitable for use).
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ticular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or fur-
nish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit
for such purpose. 2
Guarantee (i) presupposes both of the conditions necessary for the
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose: first, that the seller
of the technology has reason to know of the particular purpose
that the buyer has in mind; and second, that the buyer of
technology is actually relying on the seller's skill and judgment."
Of course, § 2-315 does not apply to many technology transfer
agreements, even those accomplished entirely within the United
States, for Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to
"transactions in goods." While a requirement that the technology
is suitable seems reasonable in light of the unbalanced bargaining
positions of the buyer and seller, Group B reaction to this and
other provisions will depend to a large extent on (a) who deter-
mines when the technology is unsuitable and (b) the consequences
of such a determination.
Guarantee (ii) requires the technology seller, lessor or licensor
to guarantee "full and complete" technology in light of the pur-
pose of the arrangement. Again, the guarantee presupposes that
the seller is in a better position than the buyer to know what the
buyer really needs, and that the buyer is actually relying on the
seller's knowledge. This guarantee is somewhat akin to § 1-203 of
the Uniform Commercial Code: "Every contract or duty within
this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement.""4 That is, in view of the seller's advantage, it would
be unfair to sell three-quarters of the necessary technological
goods and withhold that last crucial quarter, whether to sell later
or to retain a quasi-monopoly over the technology.
Guarantee (iii) bears some resemblance to (i). The technology
must be "capable of achieving a predetermined level of production
under the conditions specified under the agreement." It must do
what it is supposed to do, and produce as much as is expected. As
with the first two guarantees, Group B acceptance or rejection of
this proposal, based as it is on the realities of the technology
- U.C.C. § 2-315.
"s That both these conditions in fact exist in most transfer of technology situations shall
be developed in Section V of this Note.
- U.C.C. § 1-203.
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market, is likely to depend initially on who determines when the
technology is capable of achieving the agreed upon production
levels and whether the "conditions specified in the agreement"
have been met. Group B action will further depend on the conse-
quences of demonstrated failure of the technology. Group B
negotiators are also likely to be very interested in the relative
obligations of the parties in the event of the seller's failure to
comply with the guarantee.
Guarantee (iv) is a bow in the direction of the now unchallenged
principle that nations shall have control over all resources and
sources of production located within their own boundaries. 5 The
supplier of technology guarantees that "[n]ational personnel shall
be adequately trained in . . . operation and management techni-
ques." The Group of 77 nations are insisting that regardless of
present ownership, the technology receiving enterprise shall as
much as possible have the complexion of a local enterprise,
foreshadowing the day when the enterprise shall be locally owned.
A number of nations already have legislation requiring much the
same thing as guarantee (iv)." Again, Group B's response to this
will depend on whether the clause requires or recommends, and
on who determines what constitutes "adequate training."
Guarantee (v) is important and likely to be controversial, depend-
ing on its final wording. As presently drafted by the Group of 77
nations, technology recipients may benefit little: technology sup-
pliers might effectively close off access to further improvements
by raising the price to exorbitant levels. A better formulation in
terms of protecting the interests of technology recipients in the
Group of 77 nations might be: "The technology supplier shall
notify the recipient of all improvements upon the technology
transferred, and the recipient shall have access to these im-
provements on fair and equitable terms during the lifetime of the
agreement."' 7 Several nations have already passed legislation
" This principle is dealt with more fully in the section of the code which covers National
Regulation of Transfer of Technology Agreements.
Argentinian Law 21,617 (Art. 8), and Indian Guidelines for Industries 1976-77 (New
Delhi, May 1976), cited in Guarantees and Responsibilites of Source and and Recipient
Enterprises, Note by the Secretariat, United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, U.N. Doe. TD/AC.1/Jan. 1978 at Annex 7-7 bis [hereinafter cited as Note by the
Secretariat].
" Accord. Finnegan, supra note 16, at 106-07.
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which parallels the current Group of 77 Draft guarantee (v) by re-
quiring that the recipient have "access" to improvements. 8
It is possible that the Group of 77 Draft might even have gone a
step further concerning guarantee (v). The Group of 77 might well
have argued that since the TNEs who ordinarily supply
technology spend virtually nothing on research and development
in technology receiving countries, it is only fair that the
technology supplier be required to surrender all further im-
provements on the technology to the recipients without charge.
This gratis transfer would be premised on the theory that the
Group of 77 technology recipients are paying for research and
development costs in the Group B nations. However, "[tihe imposi-
tion of such a clause could require the licensor to contract away an
unknown improvement which might well be worth more than the
original technology. Such a result would be unreasonable and
could jeopardize transfer agreements."' 9 Perhaps because this pro-
vision was so unequivocably unacceptable to Group B, it was drop-
ped from the Group of 77 Draft after its first and last appearance,
in the groundbreaking Pugwash Code."
Guarantees (vi) and (vii) are two sides of the same coin: the
technology supplier shall not abuse a monopolistic or quasi-
monopolistic market position in its sale to the recipient of capital
goods, intermediate inputs and/or raw materials (guarantee (vi)),
or in its purchase of the technology recipient's output (guarantee
(vii)). If the supplier continues to stand in a dominant position, it is
obliged by the Group of 77 Draft to deal with the recipient at price
levels no less favorable to the recipient than the "current interna-
tional price levels." The wording of the Draft precludes agree-
ment in advance to a set price which is less favorable to the recip-
ient than the "current international price level." Both parties are
subject to the vagaries of the marketplace. Problems arise how-
ever, as shall be seen in Section V of this Note, due to this
market's imperfections. By way of example, there may exist a
cartel in raw materials, or a situation in which one or more TNE
technology suppliers in fact have a disproportionate say concern-
ing "current international price levels" of important commodities.
The wisdom of guarantee (viii) is fairly dubious insofar as
spares and replacements must be supplied "without additional
U Note by the Secretariat, supra note 46, at Annex 4, note 5.
" Finnegan, supra note 16, at 107.
' Id at 106-07, note 86.
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charges." The technology supplier, faced with a guarantee written
into his contract to this effect, is likely to insist on the inclusion of
these uncertain costs in the contract price. To cover himself, he
may very well estimate high. An alternative approach is pre-
sented in a Note on Guarantees by the UNCTAD Secretariat."1
The "possible formulation" suggested therein seems more
reasonable. This formulation requires the supplier to keep on
hand, if required by the recipient, "[a]n adequate stock of ac-
cessories, spare parts, components and other requirements
necessary for using the imported technology."52 The stock shall be
''maintained by the supplying party for such period as may be
necessary having regard to the terms of the agreement" and parts
and the like "shall be supplied to the recipient, as required, at the
usual prices."" The discussion in the text of the Note by the
UNCTAD Secretariat makes it clear that "usual costs [prices]
means those, or other related costs, contained in the original
agreement."'" This form of the guarantee would require the par-
ties to a technology transaction to discuss projections for spare
parts and repairs which might be necessary, and to discuss prices
concretely. While it apparently gives the technology recipient
less, the Secretariat's proposal actually will afford the technology
recipient more protection, since the supplier will not be able to
"guess high" as to the cost of spares, replacements and so on. A
noted United States writer concurs with the approach set forth in
the Note by the Secretariat. He concludes his brief discussion of
this guarantee with the following comment:
The licensee may be better off to negotiate an individually-
priced guarantee of spare parts, components and servicing, and
thus preclude an unearned windfall for the licensor should the
licensor's necessarily speculative prediction of parts and servic-
ing cost be higher than the actual cost. A code of conduct re-
quirement for such a no-additional-cost guarantee may therefore
have the effect of introducing inflexibility into the negotiations
rather than improving the transferee's bargaining posture.5
The last guarantee, (ix), is somewhat similar to (iv). The
technology supplier may no longer import everything (people,
" Note by the Secretariat, supra note 46, at Annex 4, note 5.
' Id at Annex 5 his.
e d.
UFinnegan, supra note 16, at 107-08.
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machines, building materials, etc., right down to bottled water)
from the home to the host country. Just as guarantee (iv) requires
the supplier to train local personnel, (ix) requires the supplier to
"take fully into account the possibility of utilizing locally available
resources." As with a number of other guarantees, Group B reac-
tion to this guarantee is likely to depend very much on who may
decide whether the technology supplier has complied with the
guarantee, and on the consequences of non-compliance.
B. Group B Proposals Contrasted
Having examined the nine proposed Group of 77 Draft
guarantees for requirements of technology suppliers, a look at
Group B proposals is in order. "A minor exception notwithstand-
ing, the Group B Code fails entirely to address the matter of
guarantees."' The exception is found in Chapter IV of the Group
B Code, "Responsibilities of Source and Recipient Enterprises," §
4.1:
Source enterprises should:
(vi) Guarantee that (a) the technology meets the description
contained in the technology transfer agreement; (b) the
technology, properly used, is suitable for the use specifically set
forth in the technology transfer agreement." (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
A few remarks concerning these two guarantees are ap-
propriate. First, under the Uniform Commercial Code, when goods
do not meet the description in the agreement, the buyer may sue
the seller and the seller may be liable for damages for breach of
contractual warranty. Thus, guarantee § 4.1(vi)(a) affords the
technology recipient one of the protections which already exists in
United States sales of technological goods. Second, guarantee (b)
provides the recipient with less protection than under the Group
of 77 Draft guarantee proposals. It corresponds somewhat to
Group of 77 guarantee (i); but Group of 77 guarantees (ii) and (iii)
additionally require that the technology be "full and complete for
the purposes of the arrangement" and "capable of achieving a
" Id. .at 103.
" Report of the Intergovernmental Goup of Experts, supra note 10, at Annex III, Revised
Outline of a Code of Conduct Consisting of Guidelines for the International Transfer of
Technology, Submitted on behalf of the experts from Group B.
- U.C.C. § 2-313, 2-601, 2-714 and 2-715.
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predetermined level of production." Third, the language used in
the Group B Draft is that the supplier should make these
guarantees. Even these rather rudimentary guarantees are in-
tended to be parts of a voluntary code, not a binding one. This
portion of the Group B Draft is written as if the parties were at
arms' length; these provisions would preserve the status quo in
which the technology suppliers of the Group B nations have a far
superior bargaining position than that of the technology recip-
ients.
Because concessions must be made primarily by Group B na-
tions, and because these concessions will inure to the benefit of
Group of 77 technology recipients for the most part, discussion of
the Group D guarantee proposals is to be found in the footnotes. 9
" The Group D Draft was submitted by the Soviet Union, the Eastern European nations
(except for Rumania) and Mongolia. Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts,
supra note 10, at Annex IV, Revised Outline of the Draft Code of Conduct for the Transfer
of Technology as Suggested by Experts from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Chapter V of
the Group D Draft is entitled "Guarantees." § 5.1 is a list of 8 things which the "supplying
party shall guarantee" (emphasis supplied). Id at § 5.1. This Draft provides that "[tihe pro-
visions of this Code of Conduct shall be universally applicable to all agreements relating to
the international transfer of patented or non-patented technology .... " Id at § 2.2.3. The
language in the Draft is difficult.
In brief, the provisions are:
1. that the supplier hire local personnel and use local resources. This is similar to Group
of .77 guarantees (iv) and (ix).
2. that the technology can be used "upon the terms and conditions stipulated in the
agreement." This guarantee is similar to Group of 77 guarantee (i.
3. that the technology supplier guarantee that "the use of the technology acquired will
lead to the achievement of the predetermined result in accordance with the provisions
stipulated in the agreement." This guarantee is similar to Group of 77 guarantee (iii) except
that the language used is stronger here.
4. that the supplier owns the technology free of any third party rights.
5. that the "documentation for the technology transferred is complete, correct, of good
quality and takes into account the local conditions of the technology receiving country." It
seems that the guarantee of "good quality" should apply to the technology rather than the
documentation. If this surmise is correct, then this guarantee resembles somewhat the
Group of 77 guarantee (ii) (full and complete technology). If this surmise is incorrect, and it
is really the documentation which is to be of good quality, then perhaps this guarantee
relates to the training of local personnel and the adaptation of the imported technology to
the conditions of the receiving country.
6. that local personnel shall be trained and the supplier shall render other technical
assistance to achieve the aims of the agreement.
7. that "upon request of the acquiring party, and upon the terms and conditions agreed
upon" the technology acquirer shall have access to further improvements and technological
assistance related to the technology transferred. This guarantee differs from the access to
later improvements guarantee in the Group of 77 Draft (v), which requires no request by
the technology acquiring party.
8. when the technology acquirer must sell his output to the seller, the price shall be no
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It should be remembered however that the final code will apply to
all transnational transfers of technology, not just North-South
transfers.
C. Need for Consensus
The effort to arrive at an international code of conduct for the
transfer of technology is likely to fail entirely unless a real consen-
sus is reached between Group B, whose TNEs are the main
technology owners, and the Group of 77, the primary technology
acquirers. There must be agreement on the content of the code of
conduct and on its legal nature. There are at least three different
aspects of the legal nature issue which will have to be resolved: (1)
Will the code of conduct be binding or simply persuasive in
nature? (2) Will the code be addressed to governments or to the
parties to a technology transaction, whoever they may be? (3) Will
the code become international law or will it have to be made effec-
tive through national legislation? ° One writer has claimed that
"[t]he substance of the [Group of] 77 Outline, which incorporates
radical departures from the traditional concepts followed in inter-
national licensing practice, is likely to be issued by UNCTAD as
the finalized Code of Conduct due to the numerical superiority of
the developing countries within the Conference."6 This view, it
seems, is clearly wrong: it is very unlikely at this point that the
Group of 77 nations (who now number over 100) would ram
through the Conference a tough and "binding" code which would
then run the risk of being virtually ignored by the Group B na-
tions, who, after all, still have most of the technology. That sort of
political maneuver would set the entire effort back to the begin-
ning.
The reality of the situation, which is no doubt comprehended by
lower than "the current levels of world prices." This is the substance of guarantee (vii) of
the Group 77 Draft; curiously, the converse, guarantee (vi), is left out. Id. at §§ 5.1.1-5.1.8.
Group D objectives are clear and reflect the interests of the Group D nations: on the one
hand, Group D nations possess some valuable technology, which they do not want to give
away; on the other hand, the Group D nations wish to gain access to superior Group B
technology on the best possible terms, and to gain political capital in the world community
by supporting, as much as is possible given their own interests, the Group of 77 in its main
objectives. There is substantial overlap in the interests of the two groups.
wSee Rubin, Reflections Concerning the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corpora-
tions, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 73 (1976).
" Dessemontet, Transfer of Technology under UNCTAD and EEC Draft Codifications: A
European View on Choice of Law in Licensing, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1977).
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most of the experts in Geneva, is that the Group of 77 and Group
B must reach a consensus for there to be improvement over the
status quo. Group B nations must stay on amicable terms with the
Group of 77 nations in order to sustain their own economic pros-
perity and growth. Group B nations increasingly need the Third
World for the supply of raw materials and as a market for their
own goods. Moreover, Group B dependence on OPEC nations for
fossil fuels, combined with OPEC strength in the Group of 77,
means that the Group B nations must negotiate seriously. On the
other hand, the present transfer of technology system must be
changed by the Group of 77, with the consent of Group B, in order
to improve the bargaining position of Group of 77 technology ac-
quirers in negotiations with Group B owners of technology
(TNEs). The Group B Draft itself realizes this point in its section,
"Objectives and Principles,"8 which includes among its objectives
"[t]o encourage and facilitate the access to and the international
flow of proprietary and non-proprietary technology under fair and
reasonable and mutually-agreed terms and conditions."' Drafting
a code of conduct for the international transfer of technology
which is totally unacceptable to Group B nations would create
another area of international law which, like international human
rights law, would be widely ignored, with impunity.
III. UNITED STATES LAW CONCERNING GUARANTEES IN
AGREEMENTS FOR THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
Agreements in which technology changes hands are character-
ized by a number of variations." This section will look at
" Group B Draft, supra note 57, at Chapter II, § 2.2.
s'Il Another forward-looking provision is:
To facilitate and encourage the growth of the scientific and technological
capabilities of all countries including the ability to develop indigenous technology
so that all countries may participate in world production and exchange of
technology.
Id.
The Group of 77 Draft handles the concept "transfer of technology" in this way:
2.3 The Code shall apply, inter alia, to the following international transactions,
agreements or arrangements for the transfer of technology:
(i) Assignment, sale and licensing transactions covering all forms of industrial
property including patents, inventors certificates, utility models, industrial
designs, trademarks, service names and trade names.
(ii) Arrangements covering the provision of know-how and technical expertise
in the form of feasibility studies, plans, diagrams, models, instructions, guides,
formulae, the supply of services, specifications and/or involving technical, ad-
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guarantees in United States law covering two different and rather
common forms of transfer of technology agreements: first, the
sale of goods which are technological in nature, and second, the
licensing of technology, both patented and unpatented.
A. The Sale of Goods
A transfer of technology transaction in the form of a contract
for the sale of technological goods in the United States is governed
by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. s An excellent sum-
mary of guarantees in such a contract appears in the Note by the
UNCTAD Secretariat:
It would appear that in United States law what are called
"guarantees" in the drafts would be known as "warranties." In
the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code it is provided that an ex-
press warranty by the seller in a contract for the sale of goods
has the following effect: "Any affirmation of fact or promise
made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express war-
ranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise" (Section 2-313, paragraph 1(a)). It is further stated (in
paragraph 2) that "it is not necessary to the creation of an ex-
press warranty that the seller use formal words such as "war-
ranty" or "guarantee"... ."
Thus U.S. law recognizes the use of the word "guarantee" but
its formal effect is to constitute a warranty in law which is im-
ported into the contract. As the warranty is defined as going to
the "basis of the bargain" the effect of a breach of warranty by
the seller is that the buyer may treat the contract as at an end
and repudiate the transaction."
visory and managerial personnel, and personnel training as well as equipment for
training;
(iii) Arrangements covering the provision of basic or detailed engineering
designs, the installation and operation of plant and equipment;
(iv) Purchases, leases and other forms of acquisition of machinery, equipment,
intermediate goods and/or raw materials, in so far as they are part of transac-
tions, arrangements or agreements involving technology transfers;
(v) Industrial and technical co-operation arrangements of any kind including
turn-key agreements, international sub-contracting as well as provision of
management and marketing services.
Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts, supra note 10, at Annex II, § 2.3. See
also note 3, supra.
U.C.C. § 2-102.
Note by the Secretariat, supra note 46, at 3 (footnote omitted).
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Thus, a party acquiring technology in a transaction covered by
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) would be protected by a
clause in the agreement describing and explaining the use of the
technological goods. Moreover, a standard clause which excludes
"all warranties, express or implied" would likely have little effect
due to § 2-316(1). That Code section seeks to protect the buyer
from such clauses. "[Niegation or limitation [of an express war-
ranty] is inoperative to the extent that such construction is
unreasonable." Comment 1 to § 2-316(1) explains that this section
"seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained
language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when
inconsistent with the language of express warranty .... ,"8
There are two types of implied warranties under the Uniform
Commercial Code. The first is the implied warranty of merchan-
tability. 9 If the technology seller is a "merchant with respect to
goods of that kind," the goods must be at least such as "pass
without objection in the trade under the contract description,"70
and "are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used."'" The implied warranty of merchantability may, however,
be excluded from the agreement by a conspicuous writing,72 by
oral exclusion of the "warranty of merchantability, 73 by expres-
sions such as, "as is" and "with all faults,"' by course of dealing,75
and by the buyer's examination (or refusal to examine) when ex-
amination should have revealed the defect at issue.6
The second implied warranty (perhaps the most important of all
warranties in view of the often unequal position of the parties in
many transfer of technology transactions) is the implied warranty
Words or conduct relevent to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Ar-
ticle on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is in-
operative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
U.C.C. § 2-316(1).
6Id.
09 U.C.C. § 2-314.
U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a).
1 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c).
- U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
n Id.
" U.C.C. § 2-316(3(a).
75 U.C.C. § 2-3163(c).
- U.C.C. § 2-316(3(b).
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of fitness for a particular purpose.77 The applicable UCC section
reads:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and
that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose."
The Official Comment distinguishes between "particular purpose"
and "ordinary purpose" in the implied warranty of merchant-
ability, § 2-314, but points out that a contract can contain both
warranties.
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may be
excluded by a writing which is conspicuous,79 or by language such
as "as is" or "with all faults" which "call the buyer's attention to
the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no im-
plied warranty." 8 In theory, this warranty can also be excluded
by examination (or refusal to examine) by the buyer, and by course
of dealing." But in view of the reliance element necessary for the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, these modes
of warranty exclusion seem inapposite.
Thus technology buyers in transactions falling within the UCC
provisions receive some protection, corresponding roughly to
Group of 77 guarantees (i) and (iii). The buyer shall get what he
bargained for-sometimes more, never less. Section V of this
Note will discuss in some detail why the UCC guarantees (ade-
quate for the United States where the technology buyer and seller
are more often at arm's length), even though not in force in
transnational transactions, are inadequate protection for the
Group of 77 technology acquirer.
B. The Licensing of Technology
Licensing is one of the most common methods of transferring
technology from one party to another. A license agreement,
whether it covers patents, know-how, industrial property, trade
11 U.C.C. § 2-315.
78 Id
U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
- U.C.C. § 2-316(3Xa).
-1 U.C.C. § 2-316.
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secrets or technical assistance, is "written authority granted by
the owner [of the technology] to another person empowering the
latter to make or use [the technology] for a limited period or in a
limited territory.8 2 Furthermore, "[licenses have no statutory
basis, and rights under them arise from contract ... ."I Implied
warranties have not, as a rule, been written into licenses." In
cases where the technology licensed was found to be unsatisfac-
tory, courts have granted relief on a failure of consideration
theory.5
There are at least five obstacles to the raising of an implied
warranty in a technology licensing agreement:
(1). the necessity of a sale;
(2). the possibility for the licensee to examine the technology;
(3). the necessity of proving justifiable reliance by the licensee
on the licensor;
(4). the inapplicability of the UCC "merchantability" warranty
to licenses (e.g., problems in proving that the seller is a "dealer"
and that the technology is such that it would not "pass without ob-
jection"); and
(5). the problem of determining when a breach has occurred in
a license agreement.8
n BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1068 (deluxe 4th ed. 1951).
Comment, Implied Warranties in Patent Know-How and Technical Assistance Licens-
ing Agreements, 56 CAL. L. REV. 168 (1968).
'1 Id. The writer is indebted to Mr. Vukowich, author of the Comment, for much of this
discussion.
The recent case of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), now constitutes the major ex-
ception to the general principle stated in the text. The pre-Lear rule had been that "the
licensee under a patent license agreement may not challenge the validity of the licensed pa-
tent in a suit for royalties due under the contract." Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co.,
Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950). In Lear, however, the Court specifically
overruled Automatic Radio Manufacturing:
Now it is clear that any licensee may refuse to pay contractural [sic] royalties
under a licensed patent, at least from the time he notifies his licensor that he con-
siders the patent to be invalid. Such refusal is not a violation of the contract and
the licensor is forced to rely on his patent rather than on the terms of the license
contract. The Supreme Court in Lear did not base its decision on a balancing of
the equities of the licensor and licensee, but rather on "the strong federal policy
favoring the full and free use of all ideas in the public domain." Consequently, any
attempt by a licensor to deter his licensee from exercising such right of repudia-
tion may very well be considered an illegal misuse of his patent.
ECKSTROM, LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS § 6.01 [3][a] (3d ed. 1977).
" Comment, supra note 83, at 186.
Id. Three of these are cited by the Secretariat in Note by the Secretariat, supra note
46, at 8.
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While there are strong policy reasons for importing the implied
warranties concepts into license transactions, tradition and case
law are opposed. 7 The arguments for implied warranties in inter-
national transfer of technology argreements will be explained and
examined in Section V of this Note.
IV. CURRENT PRACTICE CONCERNING GUARANTEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LICENSING AGREEMENTS
The essence of international practice concerning guarantees in
transfer of technology agreements may be gleaned from a few tex-
tual discussions in United States licensing manuals. It is difficult
to collect statistics on actual guarantee provisions in such
agreements because such provisions are more exculpatory than
restrictive. Figures are available for the inclusion of various
restrictive clauses in transfer of technology transactions between
TNEs and technology recipients in various Group of 77 nations."
One text, Licensing in Foreign and Domestic Operations,9
deals with warranty provisions in two paragraphs. This is the
first paragraph:
A Warranty clause, which may be found before or after the
payment clauses, is always a good one to include whenever con-
ditions permit:
Licensor makes no warranty, of any kind whatsoever,
either express or implied, as to any patents or any or all
of the said methods, processes, techniques, information,
knowledge, know-how, trade practices and any secrets
communicated hereunder.0
A more thorough exculpatory clause is difficult to imagine.
In Current Trends in Domestic and International Licens-
ing-Patents, Trademarks, Trade Secrets, Know-How, and In-
" Comment, supra note 83.
" See Egea, note 20 supra, at 16-17. See also The Role of the Patent System in the
Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, Chapter 3, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/19
(1974).
" ECKSTROM, supra note 84.
Id. at § 6.01 [3][a].
The second paragraph dealing with Warranty Provisions reads as follows:
It is to be understood that such an agreement by the licensee cannot be used to
prevent him from making the challenges to the licensed patents and information
discussed in Chapters 4 and 6 with respect to Lear v. Adkins and Choisier v.
Electronic Vision. (footnote omitted)
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dustrial Property 1975,"' two distinguished writers briefly discuss
warranties in technology licensing agreements. The first writer"
sets out a sample license. It contains no warranty clause. His brief
discussion of warranties contains the following instructive outline:
Negative warranties-deny warranty of patent validity
-deny non-infringement of third party
patents
-Licensor not responsible for licensee
operations or injury or explosion or fire
(where licensee does the designing and
supervises the operations)."
A more moderate approach is taken by the second writer,94 who
in his section on "Miscellaneous Provisions" includes the following
brief discussion:
1. Warranties.
Probably the safest warranty clause to place in a license
agreement is one that merely states that the licensor-patent
owner warrants that he has good title to the licensed patents,
and that the documents containing the know-how accurately
reflect the best judgment of the licensor in the premises, and
that no other warranty of any nature is made. There may be
specific situations in which a licensee would wish to insist that
the licensor make additional warranties, but most licensors are
well advised to be wary of entering into specific warranties on
intangible, technological property rights.95 (Emphasis added.)
As we have seen above, under United States law, in the absence
of a "sale" under the Uniform Commercial Code of goods of a
technological nature, no warranties are implied by law in a con-
tract which contains no explicit warranty provisions. The text
writers above suggest the inclusion of clauses in transfer of
technology contracts which exclude all warranties, express or im-,
plied, by the licensor. If this is the case in the United States,
where the bargaining parties are generally at arm's length, one
can legitimately infer that the situation in most transnational
transfer of technology agreements is probably worse. Unless the
" Edited by M. Finnegan and D. Smith (Public Law Institute).
9 D. Smith, "How to"- Corporate Licensing, Domestic and Foreign 11.
Id. at 24.
M. Finnegan, International Patent and Know-How Licensing: The Rules of the Game
113.
" Id at 157.
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national legislation of the technology-receiving nation requires it,
guarantees are not likely to exist in international transfer of
technology agreements. If a "guarantee" clause is to be found, it is
likely to simply disavow all guarantees." It would appear from the
literature that guarantees are an aspect of transfer of technology
agreements that is rarely negotiated. Not only are the parties not
at arm's length; it seems that here, as elsewhere, the supplier of
technology has a greatly superior bargaining position.
V. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR THE INCLUSION OF GROUP
OF 77 GUARANTEE PROVISIONS IN TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
AGREEMENTS
This section of the Note will argue that the Group of 77
guarantee provisions are generally reasonable and should be in-
cluded in international transfer of technology agreements. Since
these provisions are reasonable, it follows that the Group B na-
tions should accept most of these supplier guarantees in the pro-
posed international code of conduct on transfer of technology. 7
A brief summary of the imperfections of the international
technology market is necessary as a preface to the arguments that
follow. If the market worked perfectly, presumably there would
be no need for international regulation.
A study by the UNCTAD Secretariat98 summarizes the im-
perfections in the technology market:
[1] the absence of primary information in developing countries
about the relative merits of alternative technologies available
and alternative economic opportunities; [21 the complexity and
extreme heterogeneity of technology, in contrast to other com-
modities, making it difficult to price as a commodity; [3] the
structure of the market, more monopolistic than product
markets, in which technological information is a jealously guarded
The assumption is that transfer of technology agreements are consistent in containing
clauses which favor the technology supplier:
[flor example, out of 451 contracts examined in the Andean Group countries, 319
included export restrictions...; in Peru, out of 89 contracts, 55 included tie-in ar-
rangements on the purchase of raw materials by licensees; ....
Egea, supra note 20, at 16-17. If one thinks of a clause denying all guarantees as analogous
to these restrictive clauses, it is logical to assume that such a clause would appear with
quite some frequency.
'" The issue of the legal nature of the code is discussed very briefly in Section I of this
Note, supra.
" The Possibility and Feasibility of an International Code, supra note 9.
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secret and in which the owners of technology are price givers
rather that price takers; and [4] the inadequacy of private profit
calculations in fully accounting for the benefits to society from
the diffusion of skills."
This section will discuss the arguments for the guarantee pro-
posals, according to the nature of the individual guarantees, in the
following order:
(A). guarantees (iv) and (ix), the training of national personnel
and the use of locally available resources;
(B). guarantee (viii), spare parts and the like to be supplied for
a time without additional charge;
(C). guarantee (v), access to improvements in the technology;
(D). guarantees (vi) and (vii), inputs and output under the sup-
plier's effective control to be traded at world prices or better in
respect to the recipient; and
(E). guarantees (i), (ii) and (iii), technology to be suitable for the
manufacture of the products covered, to be full and complete for
the purpose of the arrangement, and to be capable of achieving a
predetermined level of production.
" Id. at 5, 19.
As a result of these limitations of the market, price determination for
technology is much more subject to the relative bargaining strengths of the par-
ties concerned than it is in the market for commodities in general. Therefore,
the case for regulation of markets in which technology is transferred is even
stronger than that for regulating commodity markets.
Id. at 5, 20.
The greatly unequal bargaining power of the parties to the ordinary transfer of
technology agreement, i.e., the Group B TNE and the Third World technology recipient,
is explained in id. at 21-23.
Problem [11 in the technology market has been called the "fundamental paradox" and
would appear to apply to technological transactions other than those between TNEs and
Third World technology acquirers.
In order to buy information, the purchaser must already have some facts as to
the characteristics of the desired information, and in the case of technical infor-
mation, on the available alternatives from other sources. However, experience
shows that if the purchaser had this information needed to correctly (or optimal-
ly) formulate his demand, he would not need to buy more information. In other
words, the technology market would behave "properly" as a mechanism for op-
timal allocation of resources if the purchaser had information on the knowledge
he intended to buy: but the technology that is desired is precisely the body of
knowledge necessary to acquire it under rational conditions. This property of
the technological market has been called the "fundamental paradox," after Ar-
row's (1962) work. In practice, bidding is irrational unless it is based on the in-
formation wanted.
Egea, supra note 20, at 12.
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A. Guarantees (iv) and (ix)
Guarantees (iv) and (ix) can be characterized by Group B either
as an unimportant set of conditions to be considered as cosmetic in
nature, or as rather important conditions from both parties' points-
of-view, to be carefully discussed, considered and negotiated. In
the former case, a strong argument can be made that the two
guarantees should be conceded by the Group B negotiators as an
unimportant and inexpensive gesture of good will.
It is hoped, however, that the Group B nations will consider
these "cosmetic" guarantees as being important, accept the conse-
quences, and agree to them. There are several good reasons for
such a course. The first is that increased involvement of national
personnel and local resources in the enterprise will improve rela-
tions between the technology supplying enterprise and the
technology recipient, as well as the recipient's nation and people.
Good will is worth something, whether or not its "book value" can
be computed.
The second reason is that (ordinarily and within certain limits)
it will make good business sense to use local personnel and locally
available resources. There would be few cases in which, in the or-
dinary TNE direct investment, sale or license of technology to a
Group of 77 private or government technology recipient, it would
be cheaper to import personnel than to hire equally qualified na-
tional personnel. Home country personnel, accustomed to Group B
nation salaries and comforts, would have to be paid more highly,
receive more fringe benefits, perhaps receive benefits such as
overseas bonuses in the home nation, be provided with transporta-
tion, etc. As for other resources, any TNE with the profit motive
foremost will have already investigated the possibility of using
locally produced materials, which will often be less expensive than
imported goods of the same quality.
The language of guarantee (iv) requires adequate training in ...
management techniques of the enterprises." There are two
positive aspects to this language from the Group B-based TNE's
point of view. First, the language used is "management tech-
niques" and not "management." Thus, within the parameters of
the agreement itself and the other provisions of this proposed
code of conduct for the international transfer of technology, the
TNE is still substantially free to manage its own operations. Sec-
ond, in being forced to train national personnel in its operation
and management techniques, the TNE operating in a Group of 77
[Vol. 9:69
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nation will be training a group of nationals whose loyalties will lie
at least partly with the TNE. That is surely an important sort of
investment.
A caveat should be observed here, the arguments above not-
withstanding. TNEs will be, and should be, concerned with the en-
forcement mechanism for these guarantees. TNEs will probably
be most unhappy should these guarantees be legally binding and
fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the host nation's govern-
ment. TNEs are likely to insist upon, and should receive, the right
to have input into any disputes arising under these guarantees.
Whom they hire and train is of more than passing interest to
TNEs, especially as national personnel rise higher and higher
within TNE management ranks.
B. Guarantee (viii)
A few remarks will suffice concerning guarantee (viii): spare
parts, components and other requirements for using the tech-
nology to be provided for a specified period without additional
charge to the recipient. First, it makes good business sense for a
supplier to have on hand items that the purchaser might need to
keep the original purchase in running order. A ready supply not
only keeps the purchaser happy; it also keeps him coming back to
the seller to do more business. A purchaser of technology who
cannot get from the seller what he needs for continued use is likely
to take his business elsewhere. A guarantee that the technology
supplier provide parts, components and other requirements to the
technology recipient promotes the self-interest of both parties.
Also, as was pointed out above,' 0 it would seem more
reasonable (and ultimately in the interests of the technology recip-
ient) to change the guarantee to provide for spares and supplies at
the "usual prices," ie., the prices provided for in the agree-
ment, or at "reasonable prices." The present Group of 77 Draft
formulation provides for certainty in ultimate technology price at
a cost of inflexibility in negotiations and, very possibly, inflated
estimates of the technology supplier's costs in providing this
guarantee. The approach suggested by one distinguished writer
and by the UNCTAD Secretariat requires the supplier to keep on
hand stocks of spare parts, components, and the like, and still per-
mits the technology recipient to pay for the goods, at negotiated
10 See text at notes 52-54, supra.
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or reasonable prices, as he goes. In the amended form, this
guarantee amounts to good business and should be easily accep-
table to Group B nations and their TNEs.
C. Guarantee (v)
Guarantee (v), providing for the recipient's access to "all im-
provements upon the techniques in question during the lifetime of
the arrangement," is a fairly delicate topic. Suppliers are wary of
giving away valuable new technology while recipients want the
latest and best technology. Nevertheless, consensus on this
guarantee seems possible. Moreover, the formulation of the pro-
posed guarantee goes somewhat further than the Group of 77
Draft does in providing technology recipients with access to im-
provements.
The technology recipients wish to receive information about all
improvements, and access to them on reasonable terms. 0' Im-
provements are here taken to mean technical advances (patents or
know-how) which reduce costs or increase production."2 The sup-
plier, on the other hand, who is by no means averse to further
sales, simply wishes to receive a fair price for his improvement. In
rejecting the Pugwash Code guarantee on access to im-
provements, one writer struck a balance which should be accep-
table to both the Group of 77 and Group B: ". . . the licensee
should be informed of the improvements and be offered the oppor-
tunity to acquire a license to them on reasonable terms."'0 3
An important point should be noted by technology suppliers:
the technology recipient is unlikely to have much leverage on the
issue of pricing of improvements. Only the technology supplier
will have all the information upon which the price can be deter-
mined, and in the absence of agreement on price, the supplier will
lose nothing. Of course, good faith will require the supplier to set
a reasonable price for the improvements.
Thus the following wording, which should be acceptable to both
groups, is suggested: "The recipient shall be informed of all im-
provements upon the technology in question and shall have access
to them on fair and reasonable terms during the lifetime of the
agreement."
,OO The Pugwash Code formulation, requiring the supplier to give the recipient the im-
provements without charge, has been abandonded in the Group of 77 Draft.
'o Note by the Secretariat, supra note 46, at Annex 4.
'o Finnegan, supra note 16, at 106-07.
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D. Guarantees (vi) and (vii)
Guarantees (vi) and (vii), requiring the supplier of technology to
purchase the recipient's output at "current international price
levels" or better, and to sell needed capital goods, intermediate in-
puts and/or raw materials at "current international price levels"
or less, when the supplier stands in a monopolistic or quasi-
monopolistic position as against the recipient, have achieved, and
would seem able to command, a high degree of consensus. These
two guarantees prohibit the large TNE from taking advantage of
its dominant position in ancillary sales and purchases. These
guarantees also undercut transfer-pricing, which has been one
way for the TNE to "re-arrange" profits, infuriating Group of 77
host countries in the process. In his comments on these
guarantees, a noted writer states that "[i]f it is necessary for the
licensee to acquire materials or capital goods from the licensor or
its designee, a requirement that the licensor guarantee that the
prices of such materials or capital goods will be comparable to the
international market is entirely reasonable."'0 °
Both the writer quoted above and the UNCTAD Secretariat
point out that the real problem may be that a monopoly or quasi-
monopoly position held by the technology supplier precludes any
authentic "international market price" or a "current international
price level" for the goods, since the market will be highly im-
perfect. One possible solution to this problem of pricing is "a stan-
dard accounting practice which specifies a formula for pricing
such items."'0 5 The Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat similarly
contends that it "would be then desirable for the parties to specify
in their agreement exactly how the price level is to be arrived at
so that future disputes could be avoided."'" As a pricing
"perimeter," guarantees (vi) and (vii) should be acceptable to both
the Group of 77 nations and the Group B nations.' 7 Certainly,
Group B-based TNEs will find room for profitable activity at "cur-
rent international price levels" in most commodities.
104 Id. at 106.
1o5 1&
' Note by the Secretariat, supra note 46, at Annex 7.
,o The "guarantees" themselves should, in most cases, be regarded as a "net"
below which the parties will not be permitted to fall in their obligations under
the agreement.
Id. at 9.
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E. Guarantees (i), (ii) and (iii)
Guarantees (i), (ii) and (iii), that the technology is suitable for the
manufacture of products covered by the agreement, capable of
reaching a predetermined level of production, and that the
technology is "full and complete" for the purposes of the agree-
ment, are grouped together for discussion because they go directly
to the basis of the bargain-the suitability of the technology for
the purposes of the agreement.
The nature of guarantees (i) and (iii) is aptly summarized in the
Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat:
Some of these "guarantees" relate to basic provisions which are
included in the agreement for the sake of certainty in order to
ensure that the parties are getting what they are bargaining
for. These are provisions of a kind which many legal advisers
would in any case insist on introducing into a written agree-
ment. Such provisions may include ... that the technology is in
accordance with the terms of the agreement and that it meets
the description in the agreement."8
Since guarantees (i) and (iii) contemplate the technology producing
the item and the quantity specified by the agreement, they
amount to an elaborated guarantee that the technology cor-
responds to the description in the agreement. This guarantee is
little different from the Group B guarantees proposal, mentioned
above, that the technology meets the description in the agree-
ment, and that it is suitable for the use specifically set forth
therein.
One author interjects at this point that while a guarantee of the
suitability of the technology transferred is reasonable, "the licen-
sor should not be expected to warrant the suitability of
technology without some assurance that the licensee will use it
properly."'" Two points may be made in response. First, a respon-
sible technology seller or licensor should take care to see that the
recipient is capable of properly using the technology. Second, the
Group of 77 Draft contains a mandatory provision that the recip-
ient enterprise shall guarantee that "the technology acquired will
be used as specified in the arrangement." 110 The proposed Group
of 77 Draft imposes, in effect, two distinct obligations upon
108 Id.
10 Finnegan, supra note 16, at 104.
110 U.N. Doe. TD/AC.1/11, Annex II at 13, § 5.2(i).
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both parties: first, to live up to the terms of the agreement; sec-
ond, to negotiate the terms carefully, so that the technology fits
the description and its projected production goals, and so that the
recipient is able to use the technology precisely as specified in the
agreement.
Guarantee (ii) seemingly goes considerably further than (i) and
(iii), which stress obligations under a written agreement. Under
guarantee (ii), the supplier must guarantee that the technology is
"full and complete" for the purposes of the arrangement. Unlike
the other guarantees, it binds whether or not the purposes are
"specified" in the agreement. Thus if the seller or licensor has
reason to know or actually knows of the other party's purposes in
making the agreement, a warranty will be implied in the agree-
ment that the transferor's technology is full and complete for the
transferee's purposes. There has been little discussion of the "full
and complete" requirement. It appears, however, that the Group
of 77 Draft intends something very similar to the implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose.' Given this reading of
guarantee (ii), why should Group B and its TNEs agree to it?
Perhaps because a satisfied customer is a regular customer.
Other arguments for the inclusion of guarantee (ii) tend to favor
the technology recipients rather than Group B interests. A
number of helpful analogies may be drawn at this point between
consumer transactions and the international purchase or licensing
of technology.
First, in both situations, the "consumer" is ignorant. The cor-
rect choice of goods is not often apparent; further, the effort
necessary to enable the consumer to make an intelligent decision
as to what and from whom to buy or license may not be worth the
trouble. Second, it will often happen that the various merchants in
a given field (whether clock-radios or computers) will not offer the
consumer much choice in important terms of the transaction. A
consumer buying a blender or taking a bus ride is not likely to be
able to effectively negotiate any of the terms of his "agreement"
with the manufacturer or the bus line. The prospective technology
"' The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, § 2-315 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, reads as follows:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless ex-
cluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose.
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transferree often faces a similar situation. Third, not only will the
consumer have difficulty in negotiating important terms and con-
ditions, but he/she will find those included in the "agreement" to
be odious. Finally, sellers and licensors are motivated by self-
interest. Hopefully, self-interest will often meld with interest in
the consumer's welfare. However, the thrust of consumer protec-
tion legislation is to restrain businesses and to protect the pur-
chasers in consumer transactions. Such legislation seeks, by
means of protections fixed by law, to improve the position of the
consumer. There is a clear need for similar protection of
technology recipients. Group B and its TNEs are not likely to
make concessions in this area unless pressured to do so.
Due to the technology owner's superior knowledge and bargain-
ing power, and to the recipient's involuntary trust in the
technology supplier, a guarantee of fitness for a particular pur-
pose is warranted in this proposed international code of conduct
for the transfer of technology. It is primarily in the recipient's in-
terest, not in the technology owner's interest. It would be an im-
portant step in redressing the inequities in the current system of
technology transfer, and would greatly assist in the task of
equalizing the bargaining positions of the parties to an inter-
national technology transfer transaction.
CONCLUSION
With the changes proposed above to guarantees (v) and (viii),
the Group of 77 Draft proposals for guarantees to be made by the
technology supplier to the recipient should be accepted by Group
B. They are reasonable, and represent thoughtful responses to
some of the problems extant in the present transfer of technology
system.
Politically, there would be a number of benefits for Group B,
especially the United States, in accepting the Group of 77
guarantee proposals. An acceptance would mean progress in the
faltering North-South Dialogue. It would represent a more serious
First World commitment to the principles of the New Inter-
national Economic Order. Surely, such acceptance would be less
expensive, in terms of both domestic political and financial costs,
than promising and delivering one percent of Group B nation
Gross National Product in direct aid to developing countries.
Such acceptance of Group of 77 proposals would be a gesture of
good will, and would be recognized as such. It would make it clear
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that Group B nations are becoming more serious about honoring
their pronouncements on development."2
The improved relations between Group B and the Group of 77
would lead to greater international political stability and coopera-
tion in other fields. An agreement on an entire code of conduct
(especially a crucial section on restrictive business practices)
might very well lead to a drastic improvement in the overseas in-
vestment climate.
Finally, Group B can afford to be generous and ought to be
generous. It could be that a small gesture such as this, along with
other small gestures, will have a real effect in making our planet
one on which goods and services are allocated more and more
equitably.
Naturally, the converse of these arguments is that without
agreement there will be hard feelings. Relations between Group B
(and their TNEs) and the Group of 77 may worsen. The Group of
77 could be sheer force by numbers compel the adoption of a code
which Group B would consider totally unacceptable. More restric-
tive national and regional transfer of technology codes would be a
certainty.
From the TNE's point of view, the probable effects of accepting
the Group of 77 guarantee proposals provide one with arguments
in favor of acceptance. Inevitably, the price of technology will rise.
But Group of 77 technology recipients are likely to understand
that guarantees cost the technology supplier something. Aside
from this, however, it seems probable that the dollar investment
level will rise steeply due to better overall First World-Third
World relations and the greater certainty for the in-
vestor/transferor provided by an international code of conduct.
The acceptance of guarantees might also be thought of by TNEs
as an investment in good will. Finally, the TNE's corporate duty
to its shareholders mandates acceptance of the guarantee pro-
posals since, as noted above,"' most of the guarantees are good
business practices anyway.
In answer to the argument that guarantees should not be
rigidly written into all transfer of technology agreements, but
should instead be an item which is bargained for, it is to be
observed that the present practice in such agreements is also
"' See, e.g., Remarks of President Jimmy Carter to the Venezuelan Congress, Caracas,
March 29, 1978, 78 DEPT STATE BULL. 1 (No. 2014, May 1978).
11 See Section V, supra.
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rigid. Guarantees are either not mentioned or they are excluded.
The purpose of the negotiations for a code is to alter the status
quo in favor of the technology recipient.
It is recommended then that the Group B nations, led by the
United States, agree to these proposals as a sensible, fair and
relatively inexpensive way to improve the bargaining position of
the technology recipient in international transfer of technology
transactions. "Few things can be done to help the developing
world which don't hurt the developed world. This is one of
them.""'
Kevin Conboy
" Interview with Professor Dennis Thompson, Visiting Professor of International Law
at the University of Georgia, in Athens, Georgia (November 1, 1978).
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ADDENDUM
The results of the 7th plenary meeting of the United Nations
Conference on an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer
of Technology have recently been published."5 Alterations have
been made in style and organization. Few changes in substance
have been made, however, and the disputes will remain between
Group B and the Group of 77. This addendum will briefly explain
the altered scheme of the Guarantees Chapter (see chart below
for renumbering..) and the few substantive changes made, accor-
ding to the grouping of guarantees in Section V of this Note.
Both the Group B and the Group of 77 tests are now divided in-
to responsibilities of parties at the negotiating phase and respon-
sibilities of parties at the contractual phase.' The Group of 77
text also includes subsections on Consideration for the technology
transferred, Liability and Guarantees that governments may re-
quire. Most of the guarantees required of the technology supplier
"' See Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology (as at the ad-
journment of the Conference on 11 November 1978), UNCTAD, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/9,
and Documents of the Conference, UNCTAD, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/10.
lie
New Numbers-U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/10
Group of 77 Group of B
Old numbers Negotiating Contractual Optional
Guarantee (i) 4.(iv)
Guarantee (ii) 4.(viii)
Guarantee (iii) 4.(vii) 10.(vii)
(exports)
Guarantee (iv) 2.(a) 4.(ix) 10.(viii) 4.1.(eXi)
10.(ii)
Guarantee (v) 4.(i) 4.2.(i)
Guarantee (vi) 6.
Guarantee (vii) 7.
Guarantee (viii) 4.(x) 4.1.(e)(iii)
Guarantee (ix) 2.(a) 10.(ii) 4.1.(e)(ii)
10.(iii)
10.(v)
Suitability for use 4.(iv) 4.2.(v)
Technology meets
description 4.(iii) 4.2.(iv)
Supplier's rights to 3.(c)(i)(bb) 4.(v) 4.1.(cXii)
technology 3.(c)(i)(cc) 4.1.(c)(iii)
4.2.(vi)
.. It should be noted that the operative verb is still shall (mandatory) for the Group 77
text and should (persuasive) for the Group B text.
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discussed in this Note are now found in §4 of the Group of 77 text
(Contractual Phase).
A. Guarantees (iv) and (ix), concerning the training of national
personnel and the use of locally available resources are now
covered in a single provision at the negotiating phase;"8 national
personnel training is covered in a contractual phase guarantee,"'9
and the use of locally available resources has been relegated to
the section, Guarantees that governments may require, in three
separate clauses covering local technical skills, local inputs, and
local technology.2 ' Two alterations have been made in the for-
mulations of the training of local personnel guarantee: "manage-
ment" training has been deleted, and "where so required by the
acquiring party" has been added."'
B. On guarantee (viii), the Group of 77 has conceded. The for-
mulation found in the contractual phase of the Chapter now re-
quires that spares, replacement parts, etc. be supplied, as re-
quired, "at usual prices and for the period specified in the agree-
ment. "'a The wisdom of this change is not to be doubted. It clear-
ly casts upon the parties the obligation to discuss and resolve the
issue of spares, their prices and length of availability.
C. Guarantee (v), access to improvements, is also found in the
Contractual Phase subsection. It has been altered only slightly to
provide for access to technological improvements during the
lifetime of the agreement or "for a specific period. '23 The latter
clause is new and allows the parties more flexibility in bargain-
ing; the effect, though, is to put the burden on the supplier if the
supplier wants to shorten the period of time during which reci-
pients shall have access to improvements.
D. The provisions concerning the pricing of inputs and outputs
under the supplier's effective control, (vi) and (vii), are substantial-
ly unchanged in effect: the standard is still "current world
The supplyng party shall be responsive to economic and social development objec-
tives, including those "concerning the utilization, to the maximum extent practicable, of
materials, technology and personnel available in the recepient country, including local
technical skills and consultancy organizations." Documents of the Conference, supra, note-
115 at 30, § 2.(a).
... Id at 33, § 4.(ix).
2 Id, at 35, § 10.(ii), (iii) and (v.
12, Id. at 33, § 4.(ix). See also Section V.A. of this Note, supra.
12 Documents of the Conference,supra, note 115 at 33, § 4.(x).
', Id. at 32, § 4.(i).
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prices. "2 However, some qualifying language has been added.
Prices shall also be "reasonable and fair," and current world
prices are those which are for "goods of the same quality sold on
comparable commercial terms and conditions. "I'
E. Guarantees (i), (ii) and (iii), that the technology be suitable for
the manufacture of products covered, that it be full and complete,
and that it be capable of reaching a predetermined level of produc-
tion, have all been re-worded. Guarantee (ii), that the technology
be "full and complete," is now "complete and correct. "126
Guarantee (iii), that the technology be capable of achieving a
predetermined level of production, has been changed to a
guarantee that the "use of the technology will ensure the achieve-
ment of a predetermined result. "' This broader language is ap-
parently intended to encompass forms of technology in which
nothing is "produced."
Finally, guarantee (i), that the technology be "suitable for the
manufacture of products covered by the arrangement," has also
been broadened to a guarantee that the technology be "suitable
for the the purpose agreed upon by the parties. ", 28 The caption for
this guarantee is Suitability for use, which resembles the Group B
formulation (vi)(b),1  and the UCC Implied Warranty: Fitness for
Particular Purpose.'" It will be interesting to see, in the months
and years of negotiations ahead, whether this appropriate war-
ranty can form the basis of a broader agreement between Group
B and the Group of 77 on guarantees to be made by technology
suppliers.
"' Md at 34, §§ 6. and 7.
Id Jd.
' Id at 33, § 4.(viii).
Id at 33, § 4.(vii).
Id at 32, § 4.(iv).
', See text at notes 56-59, supra.
"s See text at notes 42-43, supra.
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